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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 We are asked to determine whether the District Court 
erred in dismissing a claim under the “whistleblower” 
protection provision of the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  The 
dispute here arises from Marie Gillispie’s allegations that the 
Southwest Regional Medical Center (the “Medical Center”) 
terminated her employment because she reported the Medical 
Center’s allegedly improper discharge of an unstable patient 
and because she reported its alleged substandard care of an 
admitted patient.     
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Medical Center based upon its conclusion that Gillispie 
had not established a prima facie case for retaliation under 
EMTALA and because various common law claims that 
Gillispie included in her complaint were preempted by state 
statutes.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. Legal Background 
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 Although hospital emergency rooms were once used 
primarily to treat life-threatening injuries and serious medical 
conditions, they have since morphed into little more than 
primary care facilities for those who cannot afford routine 
medical care.1  
 
 This shift from medical emergency management to 
primary care treatment has resulted in a “grave financial 
challenge” for hospital administrators.2  Many of them 
responded to this economic pressure by engaging in a practice 
known as “patient dumping.”  That term refers to the practice 
of refusing to offer emergency room treatment to indigent 
patients who lack medical insurance, or transferring them to 
other medical facilities before their emergency medical 
condition has been stabilized.3  Congress attempted to address 
this situation by enacting EMTALA.4  EMTALA imposes 
certain mandates on hospitals regardless of whether a patient 
who presents to an emergency room has the ability to pay for 
treatment.5 
 
                                              
1 See Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care and Public 
Emergency Department Overcrowding, 83 Am. J. Pub. 
Health. 372, 372 (1993), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1694659/pdf
/amjph00527-0070.pdf. 
2 Genova v. Banner Health, 734 F.3d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 
2013); Torretti v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 173 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Congress enacted EMTALA in the mid-
1980s based on concerns that, due to economic constraints, 
hospitals either were refusing to treat certain emergency room 
patients or transferring them to other institutions.”) (citing 68 
Fed. Reg. 53,222, 53,223 (Sept. 9, 2003)).  
3 Torretti, 580 F.3d at 173. 
4 Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Congress enacted 
EMTALA to address a growing concern with preventing 
‘patient dumping,’ the practice of refusing to provide 
emergency medical treatment to patients unable to pay, or 
transferring them before emergency conditions were 
stabilized.” (citation omitted)).  
5 Id. 
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  EMTALA requires hospitals to first examine each 
patient to determine whether an emergency medical condition 
exists.6  “[I]f the examination reveals the patient is suffering 
from an emergency medical condition, the hospital usually 
must stabilize the patient before getting into the business of 
trying to [discharge or] transfer him [or her] elsewhere.”7  A 
hospital that either (1) fails to properly screen a patient, or (2) 
releases a patient without first stabilizing his or her emergency 
medical condition thereby violates EMTALA.8   
 
 Congress included a whistleblower provision in 
EMTALA to maximize the likelihood that violations would be 
reported, and that employees who reported them would not be 
punished by the employer hospital.  That provision states in 
relevant part:  “A participating hospital may not penalize or 
take adverse action . . . against any hospital employee because 
the employee reports a violation of a requirement of this 
section.”9 
 
B. Factual Background 
 
 Marie Gillispie, a registered nurse, worked for the 
Southwest Regional Medical Center10 for 13 years and held the 
position of Quality Project Coordinator when she was 
terminated in November 2012.  Her responsibilities as Quality 
Project Coordinator included evaluating patient care as well as 
addressing patient care issues involving possible medical 
errors. 
 
 On October 23, 2012, a pregnant patient, whom we will 
call “E.R.,” went to the Medical Center’s emergency room 
                                              
6 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
7 Genova, 734 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).    
8 A negligent violation of these provisions can subject a 
hospital or physician to civil penalties not exceeding $50,000. 
42 USC § 1395dd(d)(1)(A).  Additional penalties are 
provided for gross violations of EMTALA. 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i).  
10 Appellee Essent Healthcare owns and operates the Medical 
Center, which also operates as a subsidiary of Appellee 
RegionalCare Hospital Partners, Inc.   
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complaining of discomfort, pain and vaginal bleeding.  After 
examining E.R., the Medical Center’s emergency room 
personnel discharged her and instructed her to “[g]o directly to 
Uniontown Hospital” to see a gynecologist.  The Medical 
Center did not have a gynecologist on staff. 11   The Medical 
Center’s personnel did not transport E.R. to Uniontown 
Hospital, and they were unable to contact Uniontown to 
confirm whether E.R. got there. 
 
 The next day, October 24, 2012, Cynthia Cowie, who 
was the Medical Center’s Chief Executive Officer, organized 
a telephone conference to discuss what had happened to E.R. 
the night before.  Gillispie participated in that call in her role 
as Quality Project Coordinator.   
 
 On October 25th, the day after the conference call, a 
root cause analysis (RCA) meeting was called to investigate 
whether E.R.’s discharge violated EMTALA and to determine 
whether the circumstances surrounding E.R.’s discharge 
triggered any reporting requirements under EMTALA. 
 
 Gillispie contends that she insisted that EMTALA 
required the appropriate personnel at the Medical Center to 
report the circumstances surrounding E.R.’s discharge to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health and/or the Pennsylvania 
Patient Safety Authority.12  Despite Gillispie’s alleged 
                                              
11 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 11.  
12 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) are jointly 
responsible for enforcing EMTALA.  The CMS authorizes 
investigations of EMTALA violations by State agencies and 
determines if a violation occurred.  42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m).  
The OIG assesses monetary penalties against violators.  42 
C.F.R. § 1003.500(a).  Although EMTALA does not require 
violators to self-report instances of non-compliance, “[i]t 
should be considered a mitigating circumstance if a hospital 
took appropriate and timely corrective action in response to 
the violation.”  42 C.F.R. § 1003.520(a).  Any “corrective 
action [though]. . . must include disclosing the violation to 
CMS prior to CMS receiving a complaint regarding the 
violation from another source or otherwise learning of the 
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insistence that EMTALA required the Medical Center to self-
report, Cowie instructed the meeting attendees not to report the 
incident.13  Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the RCA 
meeting, Cowie did instruct two of the Medical Center’s 
directors to visit Uniontown Hospital to follow-up on E.R.’s 
treatment.  
 
   Cowie convened a second meeting on October 25, 2012.  
According to Gillispie’s deposition, everyone in that meeting 
agreed that the Medical Center’s discharge of E.R. failed to 
comply with EMTALA.14  Gillispie claimed that she and two 
other attendees argued that the Medical Center therefore had a 
legal obligation to report the circumstances of E.R.’s discharge 
to the appropriate agency or authority.15 According to her 
deposition, Gillispie told the group “I think it’s better to be on 
the safe side of safety and report it because they’re gonna find 
out anyway . . ..”16  Gillispie also claims that she “protested 
with [Cowie] several times, or protested with the group several 
times that [they] better let them know because it would come 
out.”17  Despite Gillispie’s alleged insistence, Cowie 
steadfastly maintained that the incident did not have to be 
reported.  Consequently, no one at the Medical Center reported  
E.R.’s discharge to any regulatory authority or agency.  
 
 Representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Health did arrive at the Medical Center the next day, but they 
did not come to investigate E.R.’s discharge.  Rather, they 
came to investigate a complaint regarding a patient with the 
initials L.S.  L.S.’s family had complained that, despite 
Cowie’s contrary representations to them, the Medical Center 
had failed to discipline nurses for the poor care L.S. had 
received at the Medical Center.  L.S.’s family had complained 
that L.S. was given all of his medications at once despite his 
inability to swallow the pills simultaneously.  The family also 
                                              
violation.”  Id.  Gillispie argues she told Appellees that there 
was a duty to report E.R.’s discharge. See Appellant’s Br. 9.         
13 Report & Recommendation Mot. to Dismiss 3; SA 186. 
14 Appellees’ App’x 206.  
15 Appellant’s App’x 206–07. 
16 Appellant’s App’x 206.  
17 Appellant’s App’x 207. 
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complained that L.S. had not received certain medications on 
two separate occasions. 
 
 During an interview related to that investigation, 
Gillispie told the investigators about her involvement in the 
Medical Center’s internal review of L.S.’s treatment.  She 
informed them that only one of the two nurses who had been 
assigned to L.S. had been disciplined for errors in his 
treatment.  According to Gillispie, Cowie had falsely told 
L.S.’s family that both nurses had been disciplined. 
 
 That same day, Cowie learned of a letter that Gillispie 
had prepared to aid the Department of Health with its inquiry 
into L.S.’s treatment.  According to Cowie, Gillispie claimed 
that the letter had previously been drafted in connection with 
the Medical Center’s July 2012 investigation into L.S.’s care.  
The document was, in fact, dated July 2012, but the Medical 
Center’s information technology personnel determined that the 
letter had not been created until the day of the Department of 
Health’s investigation into L.S.’s treatment and that it had been 
backdated.  At the conclusion of the Department of Health’s 
visit, Cowie met with Gillispie and told her to leave the 
Medical Center’s premises for the day. 
 
 Gillispie complied, but, at Cowie’s request, she returned 
to the Medical Center on November 1, 2012—six days after 
the Department of Health’s visit.  Upon her return, Gillispie 
met with Cowie and gave her a letter that included the 
following text:  
 
I am also concerned about the EMTALA 
violation that occurred last week regarding the 
pregnant female and transfer of her from our ER 
to Uniontown Hospital’s ER.  This is a serious 
EMTALA violation.  As you know, you 
informed us that you decided to not report this 
incident to the Department of Health.  As I stated 
to you at the meeting last week, I believe we 
must self-report this incident.  Pam Carroll spoke 
up as well and agreed with me.  I struggle to 
understand your reasons for deciding to not 
report this incident.  I again suggest that you do 
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so, immediately, as it would be in the Hospital’s 
best interest.18     
Cowie terminated Gillispie’s employment at the conclusion of 
that meeting. 
 
Although Gillispie had not reported the Medical 
Center’s discharge of E.R. to any agency prior to her 
termination, she did subsequently report it.19  She also filed this 
suit alleging that her termination violated EMTALA’s 
whistleblower protection.  
 
C. Procedural History 
 
 Gillispie’s original five-count complaint alleged that 
her discharge violated EMTALA as well as Pennsylvania’s 
public policy.  She subsequently amended the complaint by 
adding four counts under the Pennsylvania Medical Care 
Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act.20  The 
District Court subsequently dismissed those counts because the 
applicable statute of limitations had passed.   
 
 Thereafter, a Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation recommending that the Medical Center be 
granted summary judgment on each of the five original counts 
because Gillispie had not established that she had engaged in 
any protected activity.  The judge also recommended that her 
remaining state law claims be dismissed because she had a 
statutory remedy for any such violations and therefore was not 
entitled to relief based upon violation of public policy.  The 
District Court agreed and entered an order awarding appellees 
summary judgment.  This timely appeal followed.21     
 
                                              
18 Appellant’s Br. 11 (footnote added). 
19 SA 24–32.  
20 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.101 et seq. 
21 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over 
Gillipsie’s EMTALA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It 
had supplemental jurisdiction to hear Gillipsie’s state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The grant of summary 
judgment constitutes a final order.  Thus, we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. 
 
 In reviewing a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment, we apply the same test the District Court utilized, 
“viewing those inferences that may be drawn from the 
underlying facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.”22  “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue for trial.”23  However, when a party alleges facts 
that are blatantly contradicted by the record, we will “not adopt 
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.”24 
 
III. 
 
 As we noted at the outset, Gillispie claims that the 
Medical Center’s Chief Executive Officer fired her in 
retaliation for reporting an EMTALA violation based on the 
Medical Center’s discharge of E.R., thus violating the 
whistleblower protection contained in EMTALA.  Gillispie 
also contends that, to the extent her termination was motivated 
by her participation in the Department of Health’s 
investigation of L.S.’s care, it also violated Pennsylvania 
public policy.  We address each argument in turn.  
 
1. 
 
  “In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, courts 
[have applied] the McDonnell Douglas25 burden-shifting 
framework to . . . [whistleblower claims]” under EMTALA.26  
That familiar approach was developed for claims brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 Although we 
                                              
22 Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 175 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation omitted).  
23 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 586–587 (1986) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
24 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
25 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
26 See Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co., 823 F.3d 462, 470 
(8th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases).  
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 
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have not yet specifically decided if we should apply that 
framework to resolve EMTALA claims, “we have found that 
if a statute does not provide for a burden-shifting scheme, 
McDonnell Douglas applies as the default burden-shifting 
framework.”28  Accordingly, we take this opportunity to hold 
that, absent direct evidence of retaliation, we should apply the 
burden-shifting scheme utilized in McDonnell Douglas to 
resolve whistleblower claims under EMTALA.29   
 
 Accordingly, Gillispie must first establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation by producing sufficient evidence to prove:  
(1) she engaged in conduct that is protected by EMTALA; (2) 
her employer subsequently took an adverse employment action 
against her; and (3) the employer did so because she engaged 
in protected activity. 30  As with Title VII claims, Gillispie need 
not prove an actual EMTALA violation.  Rather, she need only 
establish that “[s]he was acting under a good faith, reasonable 
belief that a violation existed.”31  The District Court concluded 
that Gillispie had not established such a prima facie case 
because she had not “made a ‘report’ as that term is considered 
under EMTALA.”32  
 
 EMTALA’s whistleblower provision protects only 
employees who have “report[ed] a violation” of one of the 
statute’s provisions.33  The District Court held that Gillispie’s 
conduct was, at most, an expression of disagreement with the 
Medical Center’s decision not to report a violation, rather than 
an actual report of an EMTALA violation.34  On appeal, 
Gillispie argues that her EMTALA claim must survive 
summary judgment because she produced sufficient evidence 
to show that she had made a report within the meaning of the 
                                              
28 Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 
157–58 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).  
29 The parties here agree that this is the correct approach to 
resolve this dispute. 
30 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015) (citation omitted). 
31 Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
32 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 3. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i). 
34 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 4. 
11 
 
statute and that this report resulted in her retaliatory 
termination. 
 
A. 
 
 The text of EMTALA does not define “report,” and 
there is a dearth of case law defining that term as it is used in 
EMTALA’s whistleblower provision.  Accordingly, we must 
begin with the premise that Congress intended the ordinary 
meaning of that term.35  If the language is clear, our inquiry is 
at an end.36  
 
 The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] ‘report’ is 
‘something that gives information’ or a ‘notification,’ . . . or 
‘[a]n official or formal statement of facts or proceedings[.]’”37  
Put another way, it is “[a]n account brought by one person to 
another.”38  Thus, the term ordinarily refers to nothing more 
than the transmission of information.  Given the absence of 
ambiguity in the text of EMTALA, our inquiry into the 
meaning of “report” need proceed no further.  Viewing the 
record and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the 
light most favorable to Gillispie, it is clear that she failed to 
establish that she actually provided any information of an 
alleged EMTALA violation to anyone. 
 
                                              
35 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); Gross 
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) 
(“Statutory construction must begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary 
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Araujo, 708 F.3d at 158 (“Statutory analysis begins with the 
plain language of the statute, ‘the language employed by 
Congress.’” (citation omitted)).   
36 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted).  
37 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 
408–09 (2011) (citing Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1925 (1986); Black’s Law Dictionary 1300 (6th 
ed. 1990).   
38 Schindler Elevator Corp., 563 U.S. at 408 (citing 13 
Oxford English Dictionary 650 (2d ed. 1989)).  
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 It is undisputed that the aforementioned series of 
meetings occurred on October 25, 2012.  The first was the RCA 
meeting, which Cowie convened to investigate whether the 
Medical Center’s care of E.R. complied with EMTALA.  The 
second meeting was a follow-up to the first.   
 
 The parties disagree about exactly what happened in 
those meetings.  Gillispie alleges that she first voiced her view 
that the Medical Center’s discharge of E.R. violated EMTALA 
at the RCA meeting.39  However, the District Court concluded 
that was not supported by the record.  We agree; the record 
does not support Gillispie’s claim that she made such an 
assertion at the initial meeting.  
 
 During his deposition, Michael Onusko, the Medical 
Center’s Senior Administrative Director of Emergency 
Outpatient and Environmental Services, testified that, at the 
end of the RCA meeting, all of the attendees “felt comfortable” 
with the conclusion that the Medical Center had not violated 
EMTALA.”40  That testimony is consistent with other evidence 
in this record.  A document labeled “Staff Timeline” indicates 
that, on October 25th, “it was decided . . . that this was not a 
potential EMTALA violation and would not be reported as 
such.”41  In addition, the following people attended the RCA 
meeting:  Kathi Comandi, the Medical Center’s Chief Nursing 
Officer; Pamela Carroll, the Medical Center’s Chief Quality 
Officer ; and Bridgett Trump, the Medical Center’s Director of 
the Emergency Department and Intensive Care Unit.  They 
agreed that each attendee believed that the Medical Center’s 
handling of E.R.’s visit had not violated EMTALA.42  
Gillispie’s contention to the contrary is further undermined by 
her own deposition.  She testified that the first meeting was a 
“fact-finding meeting”43 and that “at the end of [the first] 
meeting . . . Cindy had made a decision to send Bridget Trump 
and Mike Onusko to Uniontown Hospital that evening.”44  
When asked to recount the details of that meeting, Gillispie did 
                                              
39 SA 187; Appellant’s App’x 268; Appellant’s Br. 19. 
40 SA 122–24.  
41 SA 101–02. 
42 SA 86, 87, 03–04.   
43 Appellant’s App’x 204. 
44 Appellant’s App’x 205. 
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not testify that she told the attendees she believed the Medical 
Center’s discharge of E.R. violated EMTALA and that it 
should have been reported.   
 
 Although Gillispie is entitled to the benefit of all 
reasonable factual inferences at this stage, she must 
nevertheless point to some evidence in the record to support 
her factual assertions.45  We agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that she failed to do so.  
 
2. 
 
 Gillispie also contends that she reported the Medical 
Center’s alleged violation during the second meeting.  Her 
assertion is once again contradicted by her own deposition.  
According to her deposition, the second meeting began with an 
overview of the discussion Trump and Onusko had with 
Uniontown Hospital—the hospital to which E.R. had been 
referred.  Gillispie testified that after Trump and Onusko 
reported on their meeting with Uniontown Hospital, “there was 
a discussion.  [Cowie] said, [] we won’t report this, we just had 
some EMTALA close calls in the last few weeks.”46  Gillispie 
testified that she responded by saying:  “I think it’s better to be 
on the side of safety and report it . . . .”47  She also testified that 
“[e]verybody in that meeting” “decided it was an EMTALA 
violation but it would not be reported . . . .”48  The decision not 
to report the violation—which, according to Gillispie, 
everyone acknowledged—went unchanged even after Gillispie 
“protested with the group several times that . . . we better let 
them know because it would come out.”49   
 
 Thus, according to Gillispie’s own deposition, the 
attendees in the meeting were all aware of the potential 
EMTALA violation absent any information (or “report”) from 
                                              
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 
F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Summary judgment is the put 
up or shut up moment in a lawsuit.”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
46 Appellant’s App’x 206.  
47 Appellant’s App’x 206. 
48 Appellant’s App’x 206. 
49 Appellant’s App’x 206. 
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her.  Gillispie neither alleged nor testified that the Medical 
Center personnel concluded that E.R.’s discharge violated 
EMTALA only after she notified them of the circumstances 
surrounding it.  Any such evidence would paint a very different 
picture than the one that was before the District Court.  Instead, 
Gillispie’s deposition establishes that she expressed a contrary 
opinion about E.R.’s care only after everyone had already 
“decided it was an EMTALA violation but it would not be 
reported . . . .”50   
 
 We appreciate that Gillispie purportedly urged the 
attendees at the October meetings to report the circumstances 
surrounding E.R.’s discharge and told them that they “better let 
[the regulatory agencies] know because it would come out.”51  
However, the chronology is significant here.  Gillispie’s 
deposition establishes that her efforts occurred only after 
Cowie and the other attendees had already concluded that 
E.R.’s discharge was a violation of EMTALA.  That testimony 
is fatal to her attempt to now claim that she is entitled to the 
sanctuary of EMTALA’s whistleblower provision because  she 
made a “report” under EMTALA.  It is clear that she did not 
provide any “information” or “notification” about E.R.’s 
discharge, and she does not allege anything to the contrary.52  
Rather, she testified that she merely disagreed with that 
decision. 
 
 Gillispie’s claimed protests that the better course would 
have been for the Medical Center to self-report the violation 
was not, without more, a “report” under EMTALA.  They did 
not inform the Medical Center’s management of anything that 
was not already known.  As the District Court explained, 
Gillispie’s “argument would appear to boil down to an 
assertion that EMTALA’s anti-retaliation provisions reach . . . 
an employee’s disagreement (which we must and will presume 
                                              
50 Appellant’s App’x 206. 
51 Appellant’s App’x 207. 
52 See Schindler Elevator Corp., 563 U.S. at 407–08.  We 
realize, of course, that the Court was interpreting “report” as 
used in a different statute (the False Claims Act) in Schindler 
Elevator.  However, the Court clearly stated that it was 
applying the ordinary meaning of “report” because there, as 
here, the statute did not define the term. See id. 
15 
 
here to have been made in good faith) with the decision of 
hospital management not to report as an EMTALA violation a 
specific episode.”53 
 
 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is once again 
illustrative.  Unlike EMTALA, Title VII provides protection 
against retaliatory discharge of an employee who “opposed” a 
Title VII violation or “participated in any manner” in an 
investigation into a violation.54  We cannot ignore the 
difference between the breadth of that protection and the much 
narrower protection Congress provided under EMTALA for an 
employee who reports a violation.  Congress had the benefit of 
hindsight when it drafted EMTALA, and its decision to 
exclude certain conduct that would be protected under Title VII 
suggests that EMTALA’s whistleblower protection is narrower 
than the analogous provision of Title VII.55   
 
 It is undisputed that Gillispie did not give anyone at the 
Medical Center any information about E.R.’s emergency room 
visit or discharge that they were not already aware of.  Thus, 
Gillispie has failed to demonstrate that she engaged in activity 
protected by EMTALA’s whistleblower provision.  She did not 
make a “report” and cannot establish a prima facie case for 
relief as a protected whistleblower under EMTALA.56  
 
3. 
                                              
53 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 4.  
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
55 See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(“[W]here a statute with respect to one subject contains a 
specific provision, the omission of such provision from a 
similar statute is significant to show a different intention 
existed.  This principle of construction applies with equal 
force to statutory words.”  (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
56 The defendants also assert that, even if Gillispie has 
established a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, 
her claim nonetheless fails because Gillispie has not shown 
that the defendants’ claim that it fired her only because she 
backdated a document was pretextual.  Given our holding that 
she cannot establish that she engaged in protected conduct, 
we need not reach this issue.    
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 In dismissing Gillispie’s EMTALA claim, the District 
Court explained:  “there is no record evidence that the Plaintiff 
went to any governmental or regulatory agency with a ‘report’ 
of an EMTALA violation.” 57  However, no such evidence is 
necessary to establish that a “report” of an EMTALA violation 
has been made.  Had Congress intended to limit EMTALA’s 
whistleblower protections to information given to regulatory 
agencies or governmental authorities, it could have easily done 
so. 58 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) is not limited to employees 
who make “official reports” or who report violations to 
regulatory or governmental agencies.  Rather, Congress more 
broadly provided that “participating hospital[s] may not 
penalize . . . any hospital employee because the employee 
reports a violation of ” EMTALA.  Congress clearly intended 
to include the transmission of information under the protective 
umbrella of a “report.”  Thus, covered medical facilities cannot 
penalize anyone who informs someone about something that 
s/he believes in good faith to be a violation of EMTALA that 
was not otherwise known or had not otherwise been 
discovered. 
 
 Indeed, a contrary interpretation would strip employees 
(and patients) of the very protection Congress intended to 
provide in enacting this statute.  It would encourage medical 
facilities to quickly fire any employee who made an internal 
report of a violation before the report was made to an outside 
authority.  In such a situation, the hospital could correctly 
claim that the employee had not been penalized for any report 
under EMTALA because no such report had been made when 
the employee was penalized.  
 
 Accordingly, we hold that EMTALA’s whistleblower 
provision protects employees who inform personnel in a 
covered facility of a possible EMTALA violation even though 
the employee does not also inform any governmental or 
regulatory agency.  
 
4. 
                                              
57 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 3.  
58 Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that we must construe remedial 
legislation liberally). 
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 Count II of the amended complaint alleged that the 
Medical Center discharged E.R. in violation of the safeguards 
provided by statutory and common law.59  Count V alleged that 
the Medical Center provided L.S. with poor care by giving him 
his medications all at once and twice failing to give him 
medications individually.60   
 
 In Pennsylvania, an employer may terminate an 
employee without cause provided that “the dictates of public 
policy,” contract, or a statutory provision do not prohibit such 
termination.61  Absent any such prohibition, there is no 
common law cause of action in Pennsylvania for “wrongful 
termination.”62  Gillispie argues that, even though she claims 
wrongful termination in counts II and V, her claims may 
nevertheless survive summary judgment because they allege 
violations of various public policies.  We have previously 
determined that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a 
common law cause of action for violating public policy if a 
statutory remedy exists.  As we explained in Wolk v. Saks Fifth 
Ave., Inc., “the availability of a [statutory] remedy precludes 
other common law remedies even where the statute is not 
invoked.” 63  Although Gillispie’s wrongful discharge claims 
are cloaked in the rhetoric of public policy, they are clearly 
prohibited as common law claims for violation of public policy 
because she could have brought them under Pennsylvania’s 
MCARE Act.  
 
                                              
59 SA 188–89 
60 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 35. 
61 Spierling v. First Am. Home Health Servs., Inc., 737 A.2d 
1250, 1253 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Geary v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974) (noting that 
“an employee at will has no right of action against his 
employer for wrongful discharge” where “no clear mandate 
of public policy is violated”).  
62 See, e.g., Geary, 319 A.2d at 180; see also, Clay v. 
Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918 
(Pa. 1989) (“It should be noted that, as a general rule, there is 
no common law cause of action against an employer for 
termination of an at-will employment relationship.”). 
63 728 F.2d 221, 224 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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 Although counts II and V of Gillispie’s amended 
complaint explicitly allege that the appellees “violated, 
undermined[,] and implicated . . . the MCARE Act[,]” she now 
contends that the MCARE Act is inapplicable. 64  Her belated 
attempt to disclaim the MCARE Act, despite relying upon it at 
the outset, is likely explained by the District Court’s 
determination that counts VI-IX, which were brought solely 
pursuant to the MCARE Act, were time-barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations.65  If she is correct about the 
inapplicability of the statute, the MCARE Act would not 
preclude her from recovering based upon common law and 
public policy.  But Gillispie is wrong.  Despite her 
protestations to the contrary, Gillispie’s claims are covered by 
the MCARE Act, and she is therefore precluded from relying 
on the alleged violations of common law and public policy.  
 
 Pennsylvania’s MCARE Act expressly incorporates the 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.  The 
MCARE Act provides in relevant part as follows:  
[a] health care worker who reports the 
occurrence of a serious event or incident . . . 
shall not be subject to any retaliatory action for 
reporting the serious event or incident and shall 
                                              
64 Am. Compl. ¶¶  48 (count II), 122 (count V), ECF No. 32.  
The “MCARE Act” refers to The Medical Care Availability 
and Reduction of Error Act of March 20, 2002.P.L. 154, as 
amended, 40 P.S. § 1303.101–1303.910, replaced its 
predecessor, the Health Care Services Malpractice Act 
(Malpractice Act) of October 15, 1975, P.L. 390, No. 111 § 
101 et seq., as amended, 40 P.S. § 1301.101 et seq.  The 
MCARE Act was established to safeguard reasonable 
compensation for victims of medical negligence and 
malpractice. 
65 Gillispie v. Regionalcare Hosp. Partners, Inc., 2015 WL 
1839149, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2015) (noting that 
Gillispie “failed to assert her claims within the 180-day 
statute of limitations set forth in the Pennsylvania 
Whistleblower Statute, [43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1424(a)]”).  
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have the protections and remedies set forth in  . . 
. the Whistleblower Law.66 
Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law generally provides a civil 
cause of action for an employee whose public employer 
retaliates for reporting the employer’s “wrongdoing or 
waste.”67  As we have explained, Gillispie is alleging that she 
was terminated in retaliation for reporting the Medical Center’s 
discharge of E.R. (count II) and deficient care of L.S. (count 
V).  Her claims fall squarely within the ambit of the MCARE 
Act if they involve either an “incident” or a “serious event.”  
Gillispie concedes that she is not alleging she reported a 
serious event. Accordingly, we need only determine if her 
claim involves an “incident” under Pennsylvania law.68 
 
 The Whistleblower Law defines an “incident” as:  
[a]n event, occurrence or situation involving the 
clinical care of a patient in a medical facility 
which could have injured the patient but did not 
either cause an unanticipated injury or require 
the delivery of additional health care services to 
the patient.69 
 Count II clearly alleges retaliation for Gillispie’s 
alleged report of an “incident.”  It is uncontested that E.R.’s 
discharge could have, but did not, result in injury.70  Gillispie 
argues E.R.’s discharge does not qualify as an “incident” 
because it did require the delivery of additional health care.  
She does not cite to anything in the record in making this 
argument.  Accordingly, as the District Court correctly held, 
Gillispie’s assertion is unavailing because it completely lacks 
                                              
66 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.308(c) (emphasis and footnote 
added).   
67 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1423(a). 
68 A “serious event” is “an event, occurrence or situation 
involving the clinical care of a patient in a medical facility 
that results in death or compromises patient safety and results 
in an unanticipated injury requiring the delivery of additional 
health care services to the patient.”  40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
1303.302.  
69 Id. § 1303.302 (footnote added).   
70 See Appellant’s Br. 29; SA 220.  
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evidentiary support.71  Thus, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that the claims in count II clearly could have been 
brought pursuant to the MCARE Act.    
 
 Count V, which concerns the treatment of L.S., is 
similarly precluded because it too could have been brought 
under the MCARE Act.  In an attempt to remove the claim 
from the ambit of the MCARE Act, Gillispie argues that her 
report to the Department of Health regarding L.S.’s care did 
not involve an “incident” because the alleged poor care could 
not have caused L.S. injury.72  But again, Gillispie has failed 
to produce evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  
The District Court therefore had “little difficulty finding that a 
hospital patient receiving medication in a manner ill-suited for 
his physiology as well as failing to receive required medication 
as needed could have resulted in an injury to him and/or 
required that he received additional health care services.”73  
Gillispie has made no attempt to refute this finding, and 
contrary evidence does not exist in the record.74 
 
 The MCARE Act provides Gillispie with a statutory 
remedy, and, as a result, she may not also allege a public 
policy-based wrongful discharge claim.  Accordingly, counts 
II and V of the amended complaint were properly dismissed.  
 
5. 
 
 In an eleventh-hour attempt to save counts II and V, 
Gillispie now contends the public policy-based claims survive 
even in the light of an applicable remedial statute because any 
available remedies would be inadequate.  In Pennsylvania, a 
                                              
71 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (summary 
judgment should be entered against nonmoving party who 
fails to make showing sufficient to establish existence of 
element essential to that party’s case). 
72 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 35.  
73 Appellant’s App’x Vol. I 35. 
74 At the motion to dismiss stage, the District Court did not 
dismiss counts II and V along with counts VI–XI because it 
could not, at that stage, determine whether the claims fell 
under the MCARE Act.  Now that discovery is complete, it is 
clear that counts II and V are encompassed by that Act. 
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statutory remedy is inadequate only if it either (1) does not 
allow adjudication of the issue raised by the appellant, or (2) 
allows irreparable harm to occur to the appellant during the 
pursuit of the statutory remedy.75  The MCARE Act provides 
whistleblowers with the full “protections and remedies set 
forth in the . . . Whistleblower Law.”76  Gillispie cannot 
establish that the MCARE Act’s damages are inadequate, and 
it is not at all apparent that they are.  In any event, the District 
Court correctly concluded that the claims are now barred by 
the 180-day limitation period that governs claims brought 
under the MCARE Act. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
75 LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 544 A.2d 
1053, 1058 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). 
76 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.308(c).   
